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1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK	
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3	KDH CONSULTING GROUP LLC,	
4	Plaintiff,	
5	V.	20 CV 3274 (VM)
6 7	ITERATIVE CAPITAL MANAGEMENT L.P., et al,	
8	Defendants.	REMOTE TELECONFERENCE
9	x	New York, N.Y.
10		May 5, 2020 4:02 p.m.
11	Before:	
12	HON. VICTOR MARRERO,	
13		District Judge
14	APPEARANCES	
15 16	DILENDORF KHURDAYAN Attorneys for Plaintiff BY: RIKA KHURDAYAN	
17	BARNES & THORNBURG	
18	Attorneys for Defendants BY: LAWRENCE GERSCHWER	
19	ROBERT J. BOLLER	
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(Remote teleconference) 1 THE COURT: Good afternoon. This is Judge Victor 2 3 Marrero. I thank you all for joining us in this conference by 4 this means. 5 Would the participants identify themselves for the We have a court reporter who is taking the transcript 6 record. 7 of this conference. Who's on for plaintiffs? MS. KHURDAYAN: Good afternoon, your Honor. 8 9 This is Rika Khurdayan of Dilendorf Khurdayan, counsel 10 for plaintiff. 11 THE COURT: Thank you. 12 Defendants? 13 MR. BOLLER: Good afternoon, your Honor. 14 This is Robert Boller from Barnes & Thornburg, counsel 15 for defendants. One of my partners, Lawrence Gerschwer, is on 16 the phone as well. 17 MR. GERSCHWER: Good afternoon, your Honor. THE COURT: Good afternoon. 18 19 Is the court reporter on? 20 THE COURT REPORTER: Yes, Judge. It's Martha Martin. 21 Good afternoon. 22 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 23 So, again, let me express my appreciation for your

participation by this means. This conference is evidence that,

despite the difficulties that we're all facing with the health

emergency that is all around us, the justice system continues and the courts dispense justice. And we thank all of the people who are — who enable us to continue to provide judicial assistance services, despite the great number of challenges and difficulties that are involved.

This proceeding is scheduled in the matter of KDH Consulting Group LLC v. Iterative Capital Management. It's docket number 20 CV 3274.

The Court received filing of a complaint and has reviewed that document, along with its memorandum of law and the declaration that was filed with exhibits. I've also read the response submitted by the defendants in a letter dated May 1, and further response from the plaintiffs dated May 4th. I read the order to show cause that was considered by Chief Judge McMahon sitting in Part 1, and the preliminary injunction that she issued.

The Court has reviewed the letters submitted by defendants of May 1. And the letter, in effect, is, in my view, a motion to dissolve the preliminary injunctive relief and TRO granted by Judge McMahon. This motion could be and would be properly made under Rule 65(b)(4). And on that basis, the Court will invite the parties to address the motion, setting forth your arguments as to why the injunction and TRO that the plaintiff requests should or should not be granted, and the legal basis for your arguments.

If we proceed this way, this proceeding could be considered, in effect, a substitute for the hearing that was scheduled by Judge McMahon to be held on May 11th, with the documents that you have already submitted and the legal arguments that — and any evidence you may want to put on the record at this proceeding. It's conceivable that we may need — we may not need the May 11th hearing, and the Court could rule on the basis of the document and the record that exists as of now, supplemented by your arguments.

So let me ask whatever party may have any preliminary thoughts on that way to proceed.

MR. BOLLER: Your Honor, this is --

MS. KHURDAYAN: Your Honor --

MR. BOLLER: Your Honor, this is Robert Boller, counsel to the defendants here.

We are the ones who made the motion -- submitted the letter and made the motion last week. I think we are tentatively okay proceeding that way. I would point out that the letter that we submitted last week was -- while we're proud of it, it was incomplete in the sense that it did not purport to or attempt to raise all of the issues that we believe exist with respect to likelihood of success on the merits here. I think that we -- you know, we flagged very serious jurisdictional questions for the Court. I think that we flagged issues around notice and the balancing of the harms,

particularly given the amount of time that lapsed between when this was announced and when plaintiff came to court.

But I would note that our -- for example, our letter did not attach any documents. We didn't point to any new evidence. And so while we think -- we think that these claims and this issue can be resolved just based on the documents that the plaintiffs have submitted. If the Court is not convinced of that, we would ask for the opportunity to fully brief the issue of whether the TRO should remain in place, and to provide the Court with documents.

As I said, we haven't provided any, but there are some relevant communications that we would bring to the Court's attention; we just felt that our letter was not the appropriate procedural device to do so. But I'm happy to proceed in that way, with that caveat.

THE COURT: Understood.

Let me acknowledge that I have reviewed other issues beyond the question of the granting of a TRO and the preliminary injunction by Judge McMahon. There are issues that have been raised concerning venue. There's dispute as to whether or not the plaintiffs waited until the last moment to file this suit, without giving the defendants an opportunity to respond, and the plaintiffs obtaining ex parte relief, I recognize that all of those are legitimate issues.

However, overarching those issues is the sessional

question as to whether or not the plaintiff has made a case under Rule 65 for injunctive relief on the three or so prongs of that test, which is whether or not the plaintiff has shown irreparable harm, the likelihood of success on the merits, and/or whether the merits determinations here would be whether the balance of equities favor either the plaintiff or the defendants.

I think that those questions could be addressed as a sessional matter on the basis of what you have already submitted. I don't believe that I would need much further documentation beyond what you already put in the record. But if you persuade me otherwise, we can leave open the question as to what additional documentation may be necessary.

Plaintiff?

MS. KHURDAYAN: Your Honor, this is --

THE COURT: Plaintiff, you have the floor.

MS. KHURDAYAN: Thank you, your Honor.

Your Honor, we would like to direct your Honor's attention to the fact that this mostly addressed in our response letter, the issue of setting aside the existing TRO, which we think is impermissible and does not set aside in any case the requirement for Rule 60. And we have not addressed the merits of our motion for preliminary injunction, just because we thought it was outside of the scope of defendants' request via letter motion.

THE COURT: All right. Again, coming back, I don't see the vehicle that is appropriate here to be Rule 60. I am invoking as the appropriate rule 65(b)(4), which addresses precisely what is happening here. And defendant is essentially asking for the Court to dissolve the preliminary injunction that was granted ex parte to the plaintiff by Judge McMahon in Part 1, sitting in Part 1, on the basis of the submission made by the plaintiff then, including a memorandum of law, a declaration.

The plaintiff has supplemented that submission by your letter dated May 4th. I don't see necessarily that there's more that this Court would need in order to make a determination as to whether or not the plaintiff has carried its burden of establishing the elements for injunctive relief under Rule 65.

MR. BOLLER: Your Honor -- sorry, this is -- I apologize. It's an awkward medium, and I didn't mean to talk over the Court. So again, for the record, this is Robert Boller from Barnes & Thornburg.

The point I would make to the Court here is I believe the plaintiff addressed their position with respect to Rule 65 and whether or not they are entitled to the injunction in their moving papers. There's an entire memo of law dedicated to this point that was provided in connection with the complaint.

So it seems to me that per the Court's, kind of,

indication of the direction that you want to go, that we've heard from the plaintiff with respect to why they feel Rule 65, you know, has been met here, the requirements have been met, and they are entitled to the TRO. I'm happy to address our position with why we think that is not the case.

THE COURT: All right. Since the plaintiff has raised some concern about the procedure, I ask the plaintiff to make your presentation as to why you believe that the plaintiff is entitled to injunctive relief here under Rule 65, and address any issue that you believe not adequately addressed in your complaint and your memorandum of law and your letter of May 4th. If there's something beyond that that you think is compelling and conceivably could change or determine the outcome, make your presentation now, and then I'll give the opportunity to the defendants to respond.

MS. KHURDAYAN: Sure. Thank you, your Honor.

If I may start with giving a brief factual background of the case and what actually brought us to the point of commencing litigation via emergency relief/preliminary injunction with a temporary restraining order.

As plaintiff alleged in the verified complaint, when plaintiff initially invested and was approached by fund managers to invest into the funds, the funds were described to plaintiff as a highly liquid hedge-fund-like vehicle, with several liquidity options and quarterly withdrawals. And

plaintiff was assured that they would be able to withdraw from the funds at any point.

And the funds documents, the offering documents, also supported this position by saying that 70 percent of the fund assets would be invested in the highly liquid cryptocurrency. And only after 30 percent of the fund's asset would be devoted to very, very liquid creditors that involved cryptocurrency mining. It is in reliance on this representations and the nature of the funds and the nature of the investment that plaintiff KDH decided to invest money and subscribe to the fund.

Now, coincidentally, almost at the same time as plaintiff invested into the fund, the cryptocurrency market experienced a crash. And within weeks of investing, plaintiff reached out to defendants asking to withdraw the funds. Plaintiff was convinced that there was no reason for the withdrawal; that most of the funds were not yet invested in the cryptocurrency that crashed; and that plaintiff should remain in the fund, the fund would continue to provide quarterly withdrawals and opportunities to liquidate to investor at any point, and to basically rely on the manager's experience and expertise in the cryptocurrency trading debate.

What happened in reality is that after -- shortly after managers and sponsors of the fund received withdrawal requests from plaintiff -- and we can only view this from many

out (ph) investors as well -- they substantially deviated from the investment strategy, and they essentially turned what was supposed to be a highly liquid cryptocurrency trading fund into a mining operation.

At some point in 2018 -- and they are not sure where, because proper disclosures were never provided to investors -- they expended six and-a-half million dollars on just purchasing the mining equipment. Now, they've only raised close to \$15 million. And after the value of the funds was already declining, they spent almost half of it on mining equipment, never updated investors.

When plaintiff KDH tries to obtain any information on mining and what was happening with the funds, they -- really defendants used every known tactic or delay to avoid answering the question. And this all culminated really in December of 2019, when defendants sent a notice update to investors saying that they've decided to turn an investment vehicle, the fund, into operating mining business; and that they would be provided information -- providing information in the coming months about the proposed restructuring.

Now, interestingly enough, in the update in December, they stated that cryptocurrency mining was always the focus of the fund from day one. It is easily disputed by the offering documents themselves. This was supposed to be a cryptocurrency trading fund, not a mining business.

Now, mining equipment is subject to very, very rapid depreciation. We know, again, based on very limited investor updates that were received from the sponsors that only in 2019, the mining equipment accumulated 3.4 million in depreciation.

So the equipment that they spend six and-a-half million in 2018 is virtually worth nothing by now, in 2020.

In February, defendants sent another update saying that they are thinking of consolidating the fund with their related affiliated business, Iterative OTC. That is a separate issue, because during the past two years, when the value of the funds was depreciating rapidly, by now investors lost over 80 percent of the fund as that they've invested. Interestingly enough, related business of the sponsor Iterative OTC has been driving in the past year.

In the offering document, defendants provided that the minor mining strategy would decide that the mining operation would be mining cryptocurrency, and then selling the cryptocurrency through a related business of the sponsor, Iterative OTC.

Up until March of this year, it was really unclear what this proposed restructuring would look like. The only thing that was — the only information that was provided to investors was that we will be restructuring — we will be consolidating with our flagship business, Iterative OTC, which is a trading platform, and their other mining operation, that's

defendant Iterative Mining, LLC.

In March, investors received requests for consent, but essentially it looks like just a fourth -- fourth Securities

Exchange offer. Basically, what the sponsors are saying now is, All right, you're investors. You have three options:

Option number one. You can consent to our restructuring, acknowledge that you've received all the material information, acknowledge that you raised any conflict of interest between the fund, the new operating entity, and the affiliated entities, acknowledge that you understand the restructuring, and pay for the expenses of the restructuring. And whatever remaining funds are left, we will basically let you access the funds.

Option number two. Investor consents to the restructuring (unintelligible) if you receive all the material information, waive any conflict of interest, and we will pay for the restructuring. And we will let you continue in the new operating business on the terms that will be substantially different from the terms that you were participating in the fund with; but, nonetheless, please acknowledge you have all material information about the transaction.

Or option number three: Don't consent, and then we will ship you -- essentially they say, We will do a distribution in kind. But what they are saying is, We will ship you outdated -- the prorated share of outdated mining

equipment, minus the shipping and handling fees.

So this offer was initially supposed -- was always provided to plaintiff on March 1st, and was initially supposed to expire on March 27.

After reviewing the offering documents, plaintiff sent very basic questions to defendants about the timeline of the transactions, the payout they would be entitled to after the transaction, the anticipated restructuring expenses, really four very basic questions.

Defendants couldn't provide a definitive answer. They said that there was no such timeline for restructuring.

They've also said that this opportunity to liquidate is not a negotiation, and basically essentially saying, We can keep you locked with an illiquid vehicle if we want to.

For the end of the month in March, defendants extended the deadline for receiving consent by one more month to April 28th. On April 14, plaintiff served a demand for books and records because, once again, defendants did not provide really material and necessary information in order for plaintiff to evaluate this investment and make a decision.

When defendants refused to provide material (ph) of the documents requested, which was on April 21st, plaintiff really had no choice but to ask the Court to intervene so that the restructuring does not proceed and plaintiff has an opportunity to understand what happened to the funds, what

happened to the money, and what is it that they are being forced into.

Despite what counsel for defendants claims, there was no transaction scheduled to close on April 28. In fact, defendants on many occasions refused to provide the timeline for the actual restructuring and closing of the transaction.

April 28 was the deadline for receiving consent from investors.

And in fact, after the temporary restraining order was signed the very next day, on April 28th, defendants sent another letter to investors saying that we will basically wait for the TRO to expire or released it; and after, we are not restrained any longer from proceeding with this transaction, we will proceed with the restructuring, and we will proceed with the restructuring based on the consent that we receive today on April 28th. And this is exactly the kind of harm that we were trying to enjoin and prevent by moving for preliminary injunction/temporary restraining order.

Essentially, your Honor, this is a cause of action for securities fraud. And right now, plaintiff is being forced to exchange the limited partnership interest into ownership interest in a new business venture in which they were never planning to invest to begin with, and is not being provided any material information about the transaction or its soft chang (ph) or the possibility of the funds to -- you know, to make no firm decisions.

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So it is our position that the relief is of an emergency nature; that the harm the plaintiff will sustain will be irreparable because, as provided in the documents, the terms of the new company and of the new business venture will be substantially different to the terms that were provided to investors in the cryptocurrency fund. Or if we don't consent to the transaction, basically, the investor will be shipped outdated hardware and the fund will be dissolved.

And we also maintain that the balance of equities raised in our favor in this case because, once again, we don't see how defendants would be harmed by the TRO, as they had no set schedule for closing the transaction, and a delay in exercising some stance (ph) would not prejudice or harm defendants in any way.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

One question that bears on your last argument concerning the irreparable harm: There's a provision of the PPM that says that investments should "not be made by any person that cannot afford a total loss of its principal or by anyone with a need for liquidity in their investments."

In light of that provision, was plaintiff not on notice that these were very risky ventures, and that there could have been -- circumstances could arise under which plaintiff could lose its total investment?

MS. KHURDAYAN: Your Honor, plaintiff was aware that

this was a risky investment. However, the nature of the investment and the fund changed drastically, without notice to plaintiff. Had plaintiff known that defendants would engage in mining operations, which is completely different risk level and rigidity (ph) level from cryptocurrency trading, they would not have invested into the fund to begin with.

THE COURT: Let me address that for a moment as well.

The PPM also says that concerning this issue of the investment in the mining operations, that mining operations and equipment and participating in transactions on over-the-counter cryptocurrency, and then it says: "Is expected to make up approximately 30 percent of the master fund's combined assets."

I read that language to be qualifying, and I don't read it as rigidly and absolute as you may suggest that somehow there is a mandatory limit of 30 percent.

MS. KHURDAYAN: Your Honor --

THE COURT: Go ahead, finish. And then I will ask defendants to weigh in.

MS. KHURDAYAN: Sure.

Your Honor, what we ask the Court to do is to move at the fatality of defendants' action in what we allege is really a fraudulent scheme. Because it's not one action that defendants took the gort (ph) at into court today, it's actually all the different circumstances. It's them switching from a fund that was supposed to fall for its own

cryptocurrency trading into mining, when they had an over-the-counter trading platform set up that has exclusive price to buy all the cryptocurrency that was mined by the mining master fund.

In the PPM it says that this over-the-counter trading business was supposed to be to the fund that are more favorable than any other buyers or sellers of cryptocurrency that work with the OTC counter. We don't know if that was the case because it never send the documents.

But now what we have is a separate -- but related -- business of defendants, Iterative OTC, that is profiting substantially from the cryptocurrency that is being mined by the fund. But they are not care (ph) if the profit with the fund.

So what defendants did is they took investors' money, they bought mining equipment, and then they mined cryptocurrency and sold it to an affiliated entity without profiting from it and caused substantial damages to investors; because investors did not profit from those trades. Instead, investors were locked in a highly illiquid investment vehicle, and by now lost over 80 percent of their investment.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

What I find in your presentation is a very detailed narrative of factual and evidentiary issues; but I don't find sufficient indication of where you have made a case for

irreparable harm or for damage that could not be addressed by monetary means.

Let me ask defendants to respond.

MR. BOLLER: Thank you, your Honor.

And again, for the record, this is Robert Boller.

Taking your last point first, I agree, I think, you know, we noticed that in that entire presentation, the irreparable harm standard, you know, was not addressed. And the fact that what the plaintiffs are seeking here is money damages was not addressed. The fact that, you know, that very clearly they want to leave this partnership, they want to seek damages in connection with their departure.

But money damages, while potentially available, are not sufficient to, you know, to provide for a TRO. They've cited a number of cases that stand for the proposition that if a potential judgment debtor is likely to be insolvent, that that might create an exception. But as we pointed out in our letter, the partnership is not a potential judgment. There are no claims asserted against the partnership. The partnership is, in fact, the nominal plaintiff here, right. So the idea that the partnership should be enjoined from undergoing its restructuring and to remain in a state of stateness (ph) doesn't make much sense to us, especially when you put this into the broader context.

And I was glad that counsel brought up the letter that

she addressed to the Court yesterday, because it's worth looking at that letter and the letter that is attached to it, which was our communication with our investors the other day, to get a sense of what the context is here, which is this transaction was announced months ago. The deal documents were mailed, as counsel concedes, were sent to everyone on March 1st, which is over two months ago at this point. It was 100 some-odd pages of disclosures around the transaction and the structure. There were different options afforded to all the investors.

And so when we communicated the other day, one of the things that the general partners' letter pointed out was, Look, there are 60 limited partners in this fund. Two-thirds of them would like to go into the new vehicle; they believe in this asset class and this investment methodology. A third can't stand the volatility, for whatever reason they want out.

So of the 60 limited partners, 59 of them have made a determination about where they want to go. One, KDH, the plaintiff here, is not only refusing to participate in the restructuring, has brought this litigation, and ground the whole thing to a halt. So we now have 59 limited partners frozen and waiting on the resolution of what happens here with respect to this individual limited partner, right. And so that's the broader context here.

The claim was filed a week ago. And this letter was

sent to investors a week ago. No one else has joined this litigation. It's not like there's a parade of limited partners coming down into the court and saying, Yes, we were lied to.

I think, as the Court correctly pointed out, the PPM includes reams of disclosures around liquidity and the lack thereof, around the mining operations, around public (ph) ventures and relationships with related parties, you know, counsel did not address, but they put into the record as Exhibit 1 to the Hatami declaration, the subscription agreement, wherein they acknowledged receiving all of this. And they acknowledged specifically that they have been advised of the liquidity issue; that they have been advised of what the investment strategy was; that they might be side-pocketed; that there was a chance that their ability to withdraw, you know, would be hamstrung given market conditions. They acknowledged receiving all of that, being sophisticated enough to make the decisions, and wanting to make the decision notwithstanding these risks.

And then the only other thing I would point out in the documents, your Honor, is page 4 of the PPM -- which is right in the beginning, when they are explaining what are the high-level risks -- the manager says to them, Look, the discussion that we are having of investment strategy is subject to market conditions. This will change. And of course it would.

Because if you're the general partner of an investment firm, you have to have the fluidity and the flexibility to adapt to what's going on in the market. So they acknowledge that the market for these cryptocurrencies went down 80 or 90 percent during 2018. Well, then, of course, we weren't just going to keep throwing investor money into a fire pit, because — you know, because they think that's where we're going. The management needs the flexibility, and the documents gave the management the flexibility to do these things. So it's a bit like sour grapes to come back now and claim fraud, when this was all fully disclosed and they disclaimed their reliance on anything outside of the documents.

I have some additional points; but, your Honor, if that's sufficient, you tell me.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

MS. KHURDAYAN: Your Honor, if I may, since counsel for defendants raised a new argument about, you know, us being the only limited partner preventing this whole transaction from moving forward, and having 59 limited partners that consented to the transaction and are eager to go forward with the restructuring, if I may address this point.

THE COURT: You may.

MS. KHURDAYAN: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: And then (unintelligible) the hearing.

MS. KHURDAYAN: Thank you, your Honor.

That is really not the case, because we filed this action very recently. Plaintiff felt like they had no choice and they were forced into the transaction.

And then since then, at least two other groups of investors indicated that they also felt like they had no choice and they were forced into the transaction, and they had no other choice but to consent to the restructuring or risk getting hardware shipped. So I just want the point that characterization of plaintiff as being the only one who's holding 59 limited partners hostage is very far from reality.

There was no transaction that was supposed to close come April 28, so we are really not damaging any (unintelligible) preventing this transaction from closing.

THE COURT: All right. Well, let me thank you again.

I'm going to close the proceeding at this point.

And on the basis of my reading of the complaint and the memorandum of law of the plaintiff and the declarations, as well as the letter exchanges that have taken place in the letters of May 1 and May 4th, I am not persuaded that the plaintiff has made a sufficiently compelling case of irreparable harm, which is the most significant element of injunctive relief.

I am persuaded that this issue that plaintiff has raised in this proceeding is fundamentally a dispute over money damages; and I don't see that the plaintiffs could not be made

whole or in whatever form there may be monetary relief.

And also I believe that the balance of equities tilt in favor of defendants. Plaintiff is one of multiple partners in this transaction. And to derail the entire transaction on the basis of the interests of one party I believe is not appropriate.

So on that basis, I am going to rule that the injunction that was issued by Judge McMahon will be dissolved. And I will direct the parties to meet and confer and develop a proposed case management plan to guide the proceedings from this point forward.

Is there anything else? If not, I thank you.

And we will issue a ruling memorializing the bench determination that I have made at this point.

Thank you.

MS. KHURDAYAN: Your Honor, if I may address (unintelligible). This was filed also request to -- letter motion to request filing of certain exhibits under seal, because those were confidential offering documents. And I understand that initially it was granted, from what I understood from communication with the clerk. But then there was an additional guidance issued and docketed saying that the request to file documents under seal would be lifted, I believe, tomorrow, unless extended by the Court.

THE COURT: I will ask the parties to develop an

appropriate protective order that will determine the question of what documents should be filed under seal. Upon receipt of that draft protective order, I will endorse it. And the parties can then submit under seal whatever they deem subject to the protective order.

MS. KHURDAYAN: Thank you, your Honor.

MR. BOLLER: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

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